




Felix Wemheuer, Famine Politics in Maoist China and
the Soviet Union,








Centre d'étude français sur la Chine contemporaine
Printed version
Date of publication: 1 June 2015




Lucien Bianco, « Felix Wemheuer, Famine Politics in Maoist China and the Soviet Union, », China
Perspectives [Online], 2015/2 | 2015, Online since 01 January 2017, connection on 22 September 2020.
URL : http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/6733  ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/
chinaperspectives.6733 
© All rights reserved
LUCIEN B IANCO
After seeing the extent to which the famine remained one of the mostterrible periods in the lives of peasants he interviewed in the HenanProvince, a young German sinologist (born in 1977) carried out over
a decade of research into the Great Leap Forward. This resulted in a number
of works focusing on the famine, (1) including the present comparison be-
tween the famine of 1959-1962 and that which hit the USSR. Such a com-
parison is relevant not only because of the similarities between the two
revolutionary regimes, but also because more than 80% of the world’s
famine victims in the twentieth century died in these two countries.
The structure is not the most satisfactory aspect of this good book. Ex-
cluding the third part (Chapters 5 to 7), which is dedicated to Ukraine and
Tibet, the comparison between the Soviet and Chinese famines is covered
essentially in the first part (Chapters 1 and 2). The second part, which covers
only China, takes up and develops the themes introduced in the first part:
Chapter 3 refers to Chapter 1 (conflicting reports between the state and
peasants before the famine) and Chapter 4 refers to Chapter 2 (the way in
which the famine was managed sacrificed the countryside in order to pro-
tect the cities). An epilogue details the lessons drawn from these catastro-
phes by the two regimes, which have not experienced further famines since
1962 in China’s case and 1947 in the USSR. A substantial conclusion sum-
marises the main contributions of the book, in a similar way to how the
last page (or a little more) of each chapter sums up the themes developed
in that chapter. The reader pressed for time might therefore be tempted to
limit himself to these mini-conclusions and the general conclusion.
In doing so, he would miss out on the objective intellectual reflection pur-
sued throughout the book on what is a burning issue. While clearly demon-
strating the main responsibility of the two regimes in causing the disasters,
the author also underlines the enormous burden inherited by both agrarian
empires. Russia, too, had been a “land of famine.” (2) A peasant born in south
Russia in 1890 and living until 1950 would have lived through the famines
of 1891, 1921-1922, 1932-1933, and 1946-1947, the latter following a
famine fomented by the Nazis during the Second World War. A Chinese
peasant born in 1900 in Henan and dying at the beginning of the Cultural
Revolution would similarly have experienced the famines of 1931, 1943,
and 1959-1962 (pp. 32-33). The author could also have included the famine
of 1920-1921, which struck the northern part of the province. Even during
famine-free years, hunger was never far away and killed thousands of peo-
ple, for example in 1950, 1951, 1955, and 1956, while tens or even hundreds
of thousands of peasants fled regions hit by the “spring shortages” (chun-
huang) every year (p. 86). The situation was therefore very strained through-
out the first decade of the regime, and was nearly as tense in the Soviet
Union during the civil war and the 1920s. This was the very difficult legacy
that the two regimes managed, as best they could, before embarking (in
1929 and 1958) on modernisation drives that were excessively ambitious,
impatient, and radical, and gave rise to famine. In terms of the periods prior
to 1929 and 1958, Chapters 1 and 3 are indispensable when it comes to
understanding the famine, which was brewing before it broke out: the “con-
tribution” demanded from the peasantry in order to finance industrialisation
set the scene for the crisis, and the politicisation of hunger (saying that
there was a lack of grain was proof of ideological deviance) prevented the
victims from complaining when the famine was at its height.
In terms of the food crisis itself, the mechanisms that made agricultural
production fail have been exposed amply in many works. (3) Wemheuer
rightly draws attention to relations between the cities and countryside. The
swift growth of the industrial workforce and the rapid influx of country folk
into the cities suddenly made the provision of food to citizens holding an
“iron rice bowl” much more delicate. As food shortages worsened, both
Stalin and Mao gave absolute priority to this group, for food riots had to be
avoided in the cities, where the regime felt vulnerable and wished to main-
tain stability. In the USSR, the cities were even split into three categories:
Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk, and a handful of other indus-
trial cities had access to the grain harvested on a national level; 80 others
cities were supplied in part by the central stores, but had to turn to their
surrounding areas to make up gaps in their supplies; the remaining cities
and towns had to rely solely on local harvests (p. 63). In order to protect
themselves, the two regimes exacerbated the rural famine by requisitioning
excessive quantities from the producers so as to reduce urban rationing as
much as possible. Similarly, Wemheuer reasons and demonstrates that the
Chinese famine was finally overcome less by concessions that were granted
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– too late – to the producers (private plots of land restored, the unit of ac-
counting delegated down to the work team level, the contract responsibility
system, etc.) than by the decision – which also came too late – to send 20
million recently-arrived city dwellers back to the countryside and import
grain from capitalist countries such as Australia and Canada. These imports
helped provide food for the city dwellers, who were now fewer in number,
in turn making it possible to reduce the collections demanded from pro-
ducers. The latter were nevertheless left with the task of feeding those re-
turning from the cities, in waves staggered over several years. This departing
manpower was missed less acutely in industry because the end of agricul-
tural exports and the import of grain meant it was no longer possible to
import machine tools: industry was condemned to mark time even before
the leaders had reversed the priorities by placing “agriculture at the fore-
front.” A birth control campaign was also started in 1962, and – until a
major turnaround in 1978 – the rural exodus was restricted, as a result of
which the level of urbanisation increased only minimally, from 17.3 % in
1962 to 17.92 % in 1978 (p. 230). The lessons to be learned from the dis-
aster are analysed in the epilogue, but to my eyes, Chapter 4 (“Preventing
Urban Famine by Starving the Countryside, 1959-1962”) represents the best
section of the book.
On the other hand, Chapters 5 to 7, which make up the third section
(“Famines on the Periphery”), are less important and, in my opinion, too
long. They compare Ukraine, which was struck harder than any other region
of the USSR by the famine of 1932-1933 (Kazakhstan was proportionally
hit harder still in 1931), and Tibet, where the losses were less serious than
those in Anhui, Henan, and many other provinces populated almost exclu-
sively by the Han. These three chapters deal less with the famine itself than
with the contradictory accounts concocted by the official historiography
and the Ukrainian or Tibetan nationalists. Interest therefore shifts to ques-
tions concerning the autonomy, separatism, or secession of outlying regions
occupied by national minorities, a subject that is no doubt interesting in it-
self, (4) but that diverts us from the essential subject and contributions of
the book.
The final shortcoming of the book relates to its few instances of inaccu-
racy or inconsistency. China’s population in 1964 loses 13 million people
between page 229 (704 million) and the following page (691 million), which
is an excusable error, corresponding roughly to the natural annual growth
at the time. Table 4.3 (Average annual consumption of grain per inhabitant
in the cities and countryside, China 1952-1966) and the text on page 133
raise a more serious problem: 362 jin is probably a typographical error that
should read 312 jin, but on the next line, an incorrect calculation matches
up 386 jin annually with 493 grams per day (instead of 529). Incidentally,
the incorrect calculation is possibly closer to reality than the 386 jin taken
from Table 4.3, which indicates, probably incorrectly, that urban consump-
tion was higher in 1960 than in 1958.
These are trivialities compared to the gems unearthed elsewhere, starting
with two evocative graphs on pp. 88 and 245. That on p. 88 illustrates the
operation of the unified grain purchase and sale system that was in force
from 1953 to 1960; that on p. 245 shows the hierarchy of grain consumers,
placing at the bottom the producers of rice and wheat consumed by the
upper levels. In addition to these examples, in no particular order, are
Kropotkin’s warning (past revolutions failed because they were unable to
feed the population during times of radical change, p. 46), the comparison
between the Soviet internal passport and the hukou (p. 65), and the millions
of deaths that could have been avoided by an earlier end to grain exports
(in the USSR, all of the deaths resulting from hunger, p. 247). Furthermore,
solidly reasoned theoretical discussions introduce or provide the crowning
achievements of the empirical research. To cite but a few examples here,
the author refutes the theories amplifying the peasant resistance and its
impact (pp. 78-82, 149, and 152), and offers a critical examination of the
theories of Armartya Sen and Jean Drèze. Sen’s famous “entitlement ap-
proach” (the distribution of commodities and the denial of rights were more
significant factors in the famine than the reduction or lack of availability of
food) is ultimately shown to have its limitations, without being entirely dis-
proven (pp. 149-152 and 246). The theories of Drèze and Sen as to how
democracy is more capable of preventing famines than authoritarian
regimes succumb much more quickly to the author’s reasoning (pp. 237-
239). His arguments are as convincing as they are learned, the Soviet case
following the Chinese case before itself being encapsulated by other exam-
ples (India and Africa) and other centuries (Imperial China and its system
of organising assistance). 
z Translated by Will Thornely.
z Lucien Bianco is professor emeritus at EHESS (School for Advanced
Studies in Social Sciences), Paris (biancosud@gmail.com).
ROGIER  CREEMERS
How does one begin to understand Chinese law? How does one dojustice to the complexity of the legal (re)construction process thathas taken place since the late 1970s? Observers must navigate be-
tween the Scylla of teleological approaches that too easily assume trajec-
tories towards ill-defined notions of rule of law and democratisation, and
the Charybdis of historical determinism. They must do justice both to a con-
tinuing dominant view of law as an instrument of state power and the
agency of lawyers, judges, academics, and activists inside and outside of
the legal system who seek to develop and apply their own conceptions of
professionalism and justice. They must explore the influences of socialism
and foreign legal transplants, and the impact of autochthonous traditions
and concepts. They must cater to the preconceptions of legal scholars, for
whom the relative immaturity of China’s legal system is sometimes difficult
to conceive, and those of China experts, who are often predisposed to seeing
law as merely a continuation of politics and power and lacking autonomous
existence. 
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